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INTRODUCTION
Financial stability and policies to ensure financial stability are, as a result of the
global financial crisis, prominent as objectives of financial regulation and require
rethinking regulation and its administration. As policymakers and regulators who
focus on financial markets develop responsibilities for financial stability, they are
increasingly focusing on interconnectedness: how financial-market activity
interconnects across territorial borders, across market sectors, and through
transactional linkages.2
. Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, PO Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL, 33124,
cbradley@law.miami.edu, http://www.blenderlaw.umlaw.net. @ Caroline Bradley 2013. All rights
reserved.
1. See, e.g., BANK OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 6-10 (June 2013) (reporting on the
financial stability of the United Kingdom as required by law); Paul Tucker, Competition, the Pressure for
Returns, and Stability, in STABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: ILLUSION OR FEASIBLE CONCEPT? 200,
200 (Andreas Dombret & Otto Lucius eds., 2013) (discussing the overhaul of the banking system by
international authorities); TOBIAS ADRIAN ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS: FINANCIAL STABILITY MONITORING 2-3 (2013) (presenting a
monitoring program to promote financial stability); cf Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The
New Politics of International Financial Regulation, 48 TEX. INT'L L.J. 157, 161 (2013) (arguing that new
arrangements for coordinating transnational financial regulation through the G20 and FSB "constitute a
stark departure from the paradigm of networks of independent regulators").
2. See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], The IMF's Financial Surveillance Strategy, at 4 (Aug. 28,
2012) [hereinafter IMF, Surveillance Strategy] (highlighting the interconnectedness of the modem financial
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By emphasizing geographic, sectoral, and transactional interconnectedness (and
by emphasizing that the different interconnections are themselves linked),
supranational bodies legitimate supranational action and their claims to exercise
controls over domestic actions.' Supranational bodies can claim the ability to address
transnational issues in ways that would be difficult for domestic actors, even when
those domestic actors participate in transnational networks.! Ultimately, the
legitimacy of those domestic actors may be called into question: Dirk Schoenmaker,
for example, argues for recognition of a "financial trilemma" in which financial
stability, financial integration, and national financial policies cannot coexist.6
Supranational bodies-although subject to constraints in their founding documents-
are free of the restrictions that national law may place on domestic regulators,
restrictions that impede coordination between sectoral regulators domestically.
But recognizing that increased interconnectedness in financial markets increases
the risk of financial instability does not mean that supranational bodies will in fact be
able to address issues effectively. Governance is multilevel and dispersed rather than
centralized.' As a practical matter, networks of domestic regulators (such as the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision)-which focus on their own financial
sectors-are important for the development of international standards of financial
regulation,' and supranational bodies such as the International Monetary Fund
world); see also Fin. Stability Bd. [FSB], Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation, at 3-4
(Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter FSB, Shadow Banking] (discussing the importance of regulating shadow-
banking entities and their impact on financial networks across borders); FIN. SERVICES AUTH., THE
TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 36-37 (2009)
[hereinafter THE TURNER REVIEW] (discussing the international character of the 2007 financial crisis and
internationally focused solutions for avoiding such financial problems in the future).
3. See, e.g., IMF, Surveillance Strategy, supra note 2, at 4 (noting how the "realization that the failure
of one bank in one country can bring the global economy down" has changed the contours of thinking and
policy making, and how the IMF is "uniquely placed to respond to new global financial challenges").
4. E.g., id. at 13
(Even though financial globalization is here to stay, the architecture for safeguarding financial
stability remains predominantly national. This means that the capacity of country authorities to
cope with global or multi-country shocks is severely constrained. The Fund, with its global
membership, is uniquely placed to mobilize peer pressure and collective action.).
5. See Dirk Schoenmaker, The Financial Trilemma, 111 ECON. LETTERS 57, 57 (2011) (arguing that
as international economic integration increases, individual nations' powers with respect to financial policy
should decrease); C.A.E. Goodhart, Myths About the Lender of Last Resort, 2 INT'L FIN. 339, 352 (1999)
(noting that increasing integration of the euro zone financial systems would highlight the disjunction
between a centralized European Union (EU) monetary system and decentralized national fiscal policies).
6. Schoenmaker, supra note 5, at 57 ("The financial trilemma states that (1) financial stability, (2)
financial integration and (3) national financial policies are incompatible. Any two of the three objectives
can be combined but not all three; one has to give.").
7. Cf. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision [BCBS], Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope
of Financial Regulation: Key Issues and Recommendations, at 3 (Jan. 2010) (acknowledging that sector-
specific regulation can lead to regulatory gaps that cause "supervisory challenges and present[]
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage").
8. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level
Governance, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 233, 233 (2003) ("Modem governance is-and, according to many,
should be-dispersed across multiple centers of authority."); Paul Cairney, 'Public Administration in an
Age of Austerity': Positive Lessons from Policy Studies, 27 PUB. POL'Y & ADMIN. 230, 235 (2012) ("In
turn, 'multi-level governance' describes the dispersion of power from national central governments to
other levels of government and non-governmental actors. It stresses the blurry boundaries between formal
sources of authority and informal sources of influence when decisions are made in a rather messy policy
making arena.").
9. See, e.g., DUNCAN WOOD, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING: THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND THE
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(IMF) and European Union (EU) must cooperate with these standard setters.o
Supranational bodies are limited by the powers they derive from their founding
treaties," and incursions on domestic sovereignty are controversial.12 The experience
of the EU" suggests that harmonization of financial regulation is necessarily a slow
and incremental endeavor even in an environment where states have made treaty
commitments to harmonization": each new measure builds on those that precede it."
In practice, therefore, transnational standards bodies rely on domestic regulators to
implement the standards they promulgate. And domestic regulators-rather than
transnational regulators-attempt to achieve transnational financial regulation
otherwise than through formal and binding harmonization." Jurisdictions recognize
the regulatory schemes of other jurisdictions," and domestic regulators agree to
POLITICS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION 1 (John J. Kirton et al. eds., 2005) (arguing that the Basel
Committee "has become one of the central organs of global economic governance" as it has "play[ed] an
integral role in shaping the rules of the international financial system").
10. See, e.g., id. at 160-61 (recognizing the importance of the Basel Committee to supranational
groups and that groups such as the IMF and World Bank "have incorporated Basel standards into their
reviews of member country financial systems").
11. See, e.g., European Comm'n, How the European Union Works: Your Guide to the EU
Institutions, at 3 (July 2007), http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/how-the-european-union-works-pbNA01130
90/downloads/NA-01-13-090-EN-C/NA0113090ENC_002.pdf?FileName=NA0113090ENC_- 002.pdf&SKU
=NA0113090ENCPDF&CatalogueNumber=NA-01-13-090-EN-C ("The European Union is based on
the rule of law. This means that every action taken by the EU is founded on treaties that have been
approved voluntarily and democratically by all EU countries.")
12. Cf. EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, 2012-13, H.C. 86-
xxviii, at 6 (U.K.) (expressing concerns that national parliaments should be seen as having a role in
ensuring democratic accountability with respect to the Economic and Monetary Union in the EU).
13. Harmonization is both easier within the EU than internationally and harder. It is easier because
it takes place in the context of a binding treaty regime that spells out commitments to the creation of a
single market. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 26-32,
45-66, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 59-60, 65-73. It is harder because legal harmonization in the
EU (in contrast to standard setting by bodies like the Basel Committee) is a political as much as a
technocratic activity. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 46 (2012)
(noting that in the past national differences among the EU nations undermined efforts to "maintain a
common position" at times but that now EU harmonization has increased and supervisory authorities have
"the ability to draft technical standards with legal force when endorsed by the [European] Commission").
14. See, e.g., HM GOv'T, REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE SINGLE MARKET 13-16 (2013) [hereinafter HM GOv'T,
BALANCE OF COMPETENCES] (noting that "[w]hat is now known as the Single Market was a concept at the
heart of the original Treaty of Rome, which came into force in 1958" and discussing the evolution of the
single-market system throughout the twentieth century).
15. See id. at 15 (discussing treaty changes and new legislation aimed at improving policies already in
place).
16. See Duncan E. Alford, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision: An Enforceable
International Financial Standard?, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 237, 286 (2005) ("[B]ecause the
agreements [promulgated by international standards bodies] are not legally enforceable, nations can vary
in their own interpretation and implementation of the standards."); cf Maximillian L. Feldman, The
Domestic Implementation of International Regulations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 401, 407-08 (2013) ("Agencies
that fail to implement regulations agreed upon internationally may lose credibility with their foreign
counterparts, making future coordination more difficult.").
17. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC, European Regulators Establish
Supervisory Cooperation Arrangements Related to the Asset Management Industry (July 19, 2013)
(available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539728294#.UkjHIBaolSU)
(outlining supervisory agreements between domestic regulators in the United States with those in other
countries).
18. See, e.g., Commission Implementing Decision 2012/628, on the Recognition of the Legal and
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cooperate in supervision and enforcement. 9  These transnational connections
between domestic regulators have become more significant since the global financial
crisis of 2007.20
Solving the financial trilemma by enhancing the power of supranational
regulators would not necessarily solve the underlying problems of
interconnectedness. Even if it were possible to centralize financial-standard setting
and regulation, this new concentration of financial regulatory power would risk
making the regulatory system more vulnerable.2 1 The concentration of regulatory
policymaking risks both over-reliance on poor regulatory strategies22 and capture,23
with serious implications for regulatory effectiveness and democratic legitimacy.
Policymakers can address interconnectedness in financial markets by breaking
connections or by managing them. The transnational policy response to geographic
interconnectedness has been to try to manage interconnectedness by focusing on
financial stability as a global issue and to emphasize harmonization of standards, in
particular the harmonization of the implementation of transnational standards.24 But
despite the efforts of networks of financial regulators,25 the encouragement of
financial market participants,26 and the push by international standard setting bodies
such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the IMF for domestic regulators to
implement transnational standards by means of peer reviews and implementation
assessments,2 7 these harmonization processes are slow, and implementation tends to
be divergent rather than harmonious. 28
Supervisory Framework of the United States of America, 2012 O.J. (L 274) 32, 33 (EU) (recognizing the
U.S. legal and supervisory framework as equivalent to the requirements under EU law).
19. See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 17 (announcing supervisory agreements between
the United States and financial regulators of Member States of the EU).
20. See, e.g., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, THE FY 2014 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
AND PERFORMANCE PLAN 60 (2013) (explaining how and why the United States and other G20 nations
came together after the 2007 financial crisis to regulate swaps exchanges).
21. See Pierre C. Boyer & Jorge Ponce, Regulatory Capture and Banking Supervision Reform, 8 J.
FIN. STABILITY 206, 206 (2011) (arguing that concentrating supervisory power in the hands of a single
supervisor may make the banking system "more prone to being captured by bankers").
22. Cf THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note 2, at 39
([T]he crisis also raises important questions about the intellectual assumptions on which
previous regulatory approaches have largely been built.... The predominant assumption
behind financial market regulation-in the US, the UK and increasingly across the world-has
been that financial markets are capable of being both efficient and rational and that a key goal
of financial market regulation is to remove the impediments which might produce inefficient
and illiquid markets.).
23. See Boyer & Ponce, supra note 21, at 206 ("[W]e argue that some of the current efforts to reform
banking supervision systems by concentrating supervisory powers in the hands of a single supervisor could
make them more prone to being captured by bankers.").
24. BRUMMER, supra note 13, at 210-65; Caroline Bradley, Coercive Peer Review in Transnational
Financial Regulation: Comparative Regulatory Practice, Comparative Law, and Compliance 1 (Aug. 29,
2012) [hereinafter, Bradley, Coercive Peer Review] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
25. Bradley, Coercive Peer Review, supra note 24, at 4-6.
26. Id. at 9-10.
27. See, e.g., id. at 7-8 (explaining how the IMF and World Bank encouraged member nations to
follow recommendations from peer reviews).
28. See, e.g., BCBS, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP)-Analysis of Risk-
Weighted Assets for Market Risk, at 7 (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs240.pdf
(concluding that significant variation between banks' market risk-weighted assets resulted partly from
differing supervisory practices stemming from multiple private-sector studies).
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It is difficult to imagine that strict separations between different national
financial markets could be implemented across the board because many financial
transactions and firms are transnational. However, transnational standard setters
and domestic regulators do establish geographic separations: the Financial Action
Task Force distinguishes between jurisdictions that implement its anti-money-
laundering standards and those that do not, and it encourages compliant jurisdictions
to avoid interacting with noncompliant jurisdictions. U.S. regulators have proposed
the ring-fencingo of bank capital of very large international banks carrying on
business in the United States." U.S. financial regulators define which entities are to
be considered U.S. persons and which are not for the purpose of establishing a
geographic perimeter for U.S. rules." The United States, a member of the G20, has
agreed to participate in the FSB's peer-review process," and it has also acted more
speedily in some respects than some other jurisdictions (including the EU) in
developing post-crisis financial regulation.34 Market participants expressed concern
about possible divergence between U.S. and EU derivatives regulation, the
extraterritoriality of U.S. rules, and uncertainties inherent in the U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission's proposed approach to defining U.S. persons." In July
2013 the United States and the EU announced that they would be working together
to harmonize their approaches to derivatives regulation and that harmonization
would involve recognizing each other's rules as equivalent and issuing no-action
letters.3 ' This type of mutual recognition approach to coordinating regulation may be
all that can be achieved at this time, but it reflects a compromise: The EU and the
29. Public Statement, Fin. Action Task Force [FATF], High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions
(Oct. 19, 2012) (available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/
documents/fatfpublicstatement-19october20l2.html).
30. Ring-fencing is the imposition of "different restrictions on intra-group cross-border transfers ...
by the host/home country regulators." Eugenio Cerutti et al., Bankers Without Borders? The Implications
of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks 4 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/247,
2010).
31. See Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Foreign Banking
Organizations and Foreign Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,628, 76,629 (Dec. 28, 2012) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252) (questioning the continued suitability of a regulatory approach that
permits transnational banks to transfer capital and liquidity in the same way as before the 2007 financial
crisis).
32. See, e.g., Further Proposed Guidance Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78
Fed. Reg. 909, 910 (Jan. 7, 2013) (noting that the Commission had received a number of comments with
respect to its proposed definition of U.S. persons for the purposes of the application of regulations relating
to swaps).
33. See G20, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1 (2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7g20/Documents/London%2OApril%202009%20
FinDepsFinRegAnnex9020409_-_1615_final.pdf (stating that members of the FSB "agree to undergo
periodic peer reviews").
34. See Laws for All: Lots of Rules, but Not All Good Ones, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21547835 (observing that the United States has acted decisively by
enacting Dodd-Frank, while European regulators have proceeded in a "piecemeal" fashion).
35. E.g., Letter from Sarah A. Miller, Chief Exec. Officer, Inst. of Int'l Bankers, to Melissa Jurgens,
Sec'y, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n (Feb. 6, 2013) (on file with editor).
36. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n [CFTC], The European Commission
and the CFTC Reach a Common Path Forward on Derivatives (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Derivatives
Common Path] (available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13). The statement
noted that "[w]e will not seek to apply our rules (unreasonably) in the other jurisdiction, but will rely on
the application and enforcement of the rules by the other jurisdiction." Id.
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United States are not achieving full harmonization, but they are also not
implementing territorial separations."
Just as transnational harmonization is incomplete, so is the effective
management of sectoral and transactional interconnections in the financial markets.
In February 2013 the FSB reported to the G20 on the progress of financial regulatory
reform and noted slow progress in developing and implementing new rules relating
to derivatives and shadow banking." Shadow banking refers to activities carried out
by "financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity
transformation without explicit access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit
guarantees." 9 Despite the lack of explicit guarantees, central banks intervened
during the financial crisis to provide liquidity support to shadow banks.40 Although
market participants and trade associations argue that shadow banks make important
contributions to the financial system,41 policymakers have focused on developing
appropriate regulation to address the risks posed to financial stability by shadow
banks.42 In contrast to the dominant approach to transnational issues, policymakers
focusing on shadow banking have given serious consideration to policy proposals to
break connections rather than manage their implications. In 2011 the FSB suggested
a mixture of approaches: shadow-banking entities sponsored by banks should be
consolidated in the banking group," but banks should not be allowed to stand behind
any unconsolidated entities." Proposals to require banks that are protected by
deposit-insurance schemes to abstain from proprietary trading are an example of
breaking connections." Suggestions to break up large banks as a solution to the too-
big-to-fail (TBTF) problem are another." Reconfiguring the market for derivatives
37. See id. ("We have both made significant progress in our regulatory reforms and, as a result of our
joint collaborative effort in many places, our final rules are essentially identical. Nonetheless, our
regulatory calendars are not always synchronized.").
38. Letter from Mark Carney, Chairman, FSB, to G20 Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Feb.
12, 2013) (available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130216.pdf).
39. Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, 19 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., Dec. 2013, at
1, 1.
40. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing how liquidity facilities launched by the Federal Reserve responded to
the liquidity and capital shortfalls of shadow banks).
41. E.g., ASS'N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUR., SHADOW BANKING: AFME COMMENTS ON ECON DRAFT
REPORT 1 (2012), available at http://www.afme.eulWorkAreal/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6855 ("AFME
believes that shadow banking contributes positively to the financial system by providing significant
funding to capital markets and thus the economy, and by diversifying risk in the financial system.").
42. See, e.g., FSB, Shadow Banking, supra note 2, at 1-5 (recognizing and responding to the G20
request that the FSB focus on shadow-banking).
43. Id. at 16.
44. See id. at 19-20 ("Recommendation 4: Restrict banks' ability to stand behind any entities that are
not consolidated. . . .").
45. See, e.g., Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351, 17 C.F.R. pt. 255) (proposing a rule that would restrict the ability
of banks to engage in proprietary trading or have certain relationships with hedge funds or private equity
funds); High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, Final Report, at
iii (Oct. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Liikanen Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal
market/bank/docs/high-level-expert-group/report-en.pdf (recommending the separation of banks'
proprietary trading and other risky activities to tackle banks' complexity and interconnectedness).
46. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., FINANCIAL STABILITY: TRADITIONAL BANKS PAVE
THE WAY 26-27 (2013), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/fed/annual/2012/1201e.pdf
(discussing the merits of breaking up banks that are too big to fail); Richard W. Fisher, President, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Dali., Ending 'Too Big to Fail': A Proposal for Reform Before It's Too Late (with
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to move transactions onto organized markets is designed to enhance transparency
and also to impede transmissions of risk by inserting clearinghouses between buyers
and sellers of standardized derivatives." Requiring banks to make their own
assessments of creditworthiness rather than relying on credit-rating agencies is an
attempt to reinforce divisions between different sectors of financial activity." Some
of these proposals to break connections have run into determined opposition.49
Market participants and commentators argue that proposals to regulate to break
connections between firms and functions will impose larger costs than the benefits
new rules would generate.o Not paying serious attention to breaking connections
where possible worsens the complexity problem in financial regulation."
Making interconnectedness central to financial-regulation policy is a difficult
goal to achieve.52 Trying to address transnational and sectoral interconnections at the
same time makes the task even more complex. The EU's experience of the global
financial crisis and the sovereign-debt crisis provides a specific illustration of the
multifaceted problem of financial interconnectedness." And the EU's experience of
Reference to Patrick Henry, Complexity and Reality), Remarks Before the Committee for the Republic
(Jan. 16, 2013) (available at http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2013/fsl30l16.cfm)
(recommending the restructuring of too-big-to-fail institutions into multiple business entities).
47. FSB, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, at 9-10 (Oct. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf. The Joint Forum identified settlement
risk as a potential issue in the credit-default swaps market. BCBS, Credit Risk Transfer: Developments
from 2005 to 2007, at 22-23 (July 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint2l.pdf.
48. See, e.g., Guidance on Due Diligence Requirements in Determining Whether Securities Are
Eligible for Investment 77 Fed. Reg. 35,259, 35,259 (June 13, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1, 160)
(requiring agencies to establish, if feasible, uniform standards of creditworthiness); Alternatives to the Use
of External Credit Ratings in the Regulations of the OCC, 77 Fed. Reg. 35,253, 35,253 (June 13, 2012) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1, 5, 16, 28, 160) (outlining regulatory expectations of banks to assess
"creditworthiness of a security or money market instrument").
49. See, e.g., ANJAN V. THAKOR, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF THE VOLCKER RULE 6-7 (2012) (arguing that the Volcker Rule will adversely affect
market risk).
50. Cf Josdo Vifials et al., IMF, Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and
Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, at 18-21, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/13/4 (May 2013) (noting
the potentially significant costs of structural reform of banking).
51. See Leonardo Gambacorta & Adrian van Rixtel, Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives:
Approaches and Implications 2 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 412, 2013) (noting that
structural separation "can reduce the complexity and possibly size of banking organisations, making them
easier to manage, more transparent to outside stakeholders and easier to resolve; this in turn could
improve risk management, contain moral hazard and strengthen market discipline"); cf. Philipp M.
Hildebrand, The Sub-Prime Crisis: A Central Banker's Perspective, 4 J. FIN. STABILITY 313, 318 (2008)
(questioning whether complex regulatory approaches are the best mode of financial-risk management).
52. The United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority was designed as a multifunction regulator in
order to be able to regulate multifunction firms. See Eilis Feran, Examining the United Kingdom's
Experience in Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257. 260-276 (2003)
(describing the history behind and the reasons for the creation of the Financial Services Authority). After
the financial crisis the U.K. government decided to separate regulatory responsibilities for microprudential
regulation and financial conduct. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL
REGULATION: SECURING STABILITY, PROTECrING CONSUMERS, 2012, Cm. 8268, at 3 (listing the United
Kingdom's core reforms as "establish[ing] a new 'macro-prudential' authority in the Bank of England"
and "creat[ing] a powerful new conduct regulator to protect consumers and promote competition").
53. See, e.g., Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Patrick Slovik, A Market Perspective on the European
Sovereign Debt and Banking Crisis, OECD J. FIN. MKT. TRENDS, Feb. 2011, at 1, 21 (noting that one of
the major issues confronting European markets is "[tihe banking crises in some of the periphery countries
and in a number of German banks" and that "[g]iven the interconnectedness of banks, this is an issue for
2014] 277
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trying to resolve the crises illustrates the difficulty of addressing interconnectedness.5
Adopting a policy of managing interconnections and failing to implement that policy
is risky-both to financial stability and to the institutional structures that manage (or
fail to manage) interconnectedness. Adopting policies of breaking connections-
where possible-could ultimately do more to promote financial stability than
incompletely achieved policies of managing interconnection would. But attempts to
break connections between financial firms run into opposition from those firms and
their trade associations." The EU's experience also illustrates another recurrent
problem in financial regulation that the global financial crisis made very clear:
Financial stability is linked to confidence in the financial markets, and market
participants may have more or less confidence in the financial markets than the
fundamentals justify."
I. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND AN EU SOVEREIGN-
DEBT CRISIS
The global financial crisis was initiated by a loss of confidence in some financial
instruments that expanded to a loss of confidence in and an unwillingness to extend
credit to financial firms." The crisis created pressures for governments to step in to
provide liquidity to"-and even rescue-troubled financial firms.59 The crisis
revealed the interconnectedness of financial firms and markets when stresses
originating in the United States spread quickly around the world. 0  Uncertainty
about the appropriate valuation of subprime-backed securities led to uncertainty
about the valuation of other assets and to doubts about the viability of financial
all of Europe").
54. See generally BCBS, The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and
Comparability, at 21 (July 2013) [hereinafter BCBS, Balancing Risk Sensitivity] (stating that "reducing
global and domestic interconnectedness" is "beyond the direct remit of [even] the Basel Committee").
55. See, e.g., THAKOR, supra note 49, at 6 (arguing that breaking interconnections will "impede
[banks'] risk management, obstruct the ability to signal the quality of the loans they have securitized,
reduce the value of financial services offered to customers, adversely impact the 'business model' of
banking, and possibly hamper the economically-beneficial co-evolution of banks and financial markets");
Stephen Gandel, Regulators Cave Quickly in First Volcker Rule Battle, CNN MONEY (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2014/01/06/regulators-fold-volcker/ (highlighting the stiff resistance of
bankers against efforts to reduce interconnectedness).
56. See, e.g., BCBS, Balancing Risk Sensitivity, supra note 54, at 9
(Investor confidence in risk weights is also a crucial element of the regulatory infrastructure.
When stakeholders believe that risk-based ratios provide reliable signals for the absolute and
relative resilience of banks, the sensitivity of bank funding costs to changes in risk-taking is
likely to increase, strengthening the effectiveness of market discipline in good times. And
confidence in the risk-weighting regime should reduce uncertainty over counterparty solvency,
reducing the risk of strains in bank funding markets in times of stress.).
57. Bank for Int'l Settlements [BIS], 78th Annual Report, 2007-2008 BANK INT'L SETTLEMENTS ANN.
REP. 5 (2008).
58. See C.A.E. Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 4 J. FIN. STABILITY 351,
354 (2008) (discussing liquidity support that central banks provided to banks).
59. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-616, FINANCIAL CRISIS: REVIEW OF
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL ASsISTANCE TO AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 7-9,
130 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585560.pdf (discussing the Federal Reserve System's
rescue of American International Group, Inc.).
60. See, e.g., Gert Wehinger, The Turmoil and the Financial Industry: Developments and Policy
Responses, OECD J. FIN. MKT. TRENDS, July 2009, at 1, 2 ("The crisis has also reached countries and
regions which earlier were believed to have been out of the range of contagion.").
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firms." The G20 countries attempted to limit the crisis by committing to: (1) a newly
intensified harmonization of financial regulation;62 (2) a new focus on financial
stability as a focus of financial regulation;63 and (3) a system of peer review to ensure
state compliance with the new standards"M and to remind states of the "international
ramifications of their domestic actions."65
While the G20 acted collectively to enhance confidence in financial institutions,
individual states provided financial support to their own financial firms."6 But this
national financial support strained public finances, most visibly in certain EU
Member States, and led to a European sovereign-debt crisis.' EU banks continued
to hold the debt of European sovereigns, and the EU's capital-adequacy rules
allowed these banks to do so without calculating the real risks associated with their
69investments. Thus, a "vicious circle" was created between EU banks and
sovereigns0 : banks' troubles increased problems for sovereigns, and the sovereigns'
fragilities undermined the banks."
61. See BRUMMER, supra note 13, at 211-13 (discussing speculation on subprime-backed securities as
a catalyst for a larger mistrust of all banking holdings, which eventually resulted in financial institutions
failing, receiving government bailouts, or being taken over by the government).
62. G20, supra note 33, at 1
(We, the Leaders of the G20, have taken, and will continue to take, action to strengthen
regulation and supervision in line with the commitments we made. .. to reform the regulation
of the financial sector. Our principles are strengthening transparency and accountability,
enhancing sound regulation, promoting integrity in financial markets and reinforcing
international cooperation.).
63. See, e.g., BIS, 82nd Annual Report, 2011-2012 BANK INT'L SETrLEMENTS ANN. REP. 64 (2012)
(The recent financial crisis has conveyed clear messages to market participants and to regulators
entrusted with safeguarding financial stability .... The lessons learned from the crisis have
influenced markets' and analysts' perception of banks and have led to new regulatory initiatives
that will shape banks' post-crisis business models.).
64. G20, supra note 33, at 1, 4.
65. Mark Sobel, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Int'l Monetary & Fin. Policy, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center on Mexico and the G-20 Leader's Summit (May 1, 2012)
(available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl559.aspx).
66. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/04/business/economy/04bailout.html?page
wanted=1 (noting the U.S. government's approval of a $700-billion economic bailout package and warning
that it "could become the most expensive government intervention in history").
67. See, e.g., IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Meeting New Challenges to Stability and
Building a Safer System, at xi (Apr. 2010)
(A key concern is that room for policy maneuvers in many advanced economies has either been
exhausted or become much more limited. Moreover, sovereign risks in advanced economies
could undermine financial stability gains and extend the crisis. The rapid increase in public debt
and deterioration of fiscal balance sheets could be transmitted back to banking systems or
across borders.).
68. See, e.g., European Cent. Bank [ECB], Financial Stability Review, at 11 (Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdflother/financialstabilityreview20l0l2en.pdf (discussing the history and impact
of the European sovereign-debt crisis).
69. See Herv6 Hannoun, Deputy Gen. Manager, BIS, Sovereign Risk in Bank Regulation and
Supervision: Where Do We Stand?, Remarks before the Fin. Stability Inst. High-Level Meeting 15 (Oct.
26, 2011), (available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp111026.pdf) (acknowledging that before the
establishment of the European Banking Authority, the EU-along with governments in other advanced
economies-did not regulate in such a way as to recognize the inherent "sovereign risk in banks' risk
measurement and capital adequacy").
70. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Eurogroup Statement on the Follow-Up of the 29
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The combined financial and sovereign-debt crises forced the EU to provide
emergency financial support to EU banks and sovereigns. For example, the
European Central Bank (ECB) gave support to banks under long-term refinancing
operations72 and established a Securities Markets Programme (SMP) to purchase
sovereign debt." The ECB explained that the purpose of the SMP was "to address
the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy
transmission mechanism."" The EU took other measures to manage the
interconnections between public debt and the regulation of banks and to take steps
to limit speculation (by means of credit-default swaps) in the debt of EU Member
States." However, the combined crises had implications beyond Europe.
Policymakers worried about the risk that the European problems could infect other
parts of the world." Lending to emerging-market economies fell as European banks
suffered."
These two linked crises illustrate the persistent tension in financial-market
regulation between transnational markets and firms on the one hand and local
regulation and politics on the other." As Mervyn King observed, banks may be
international in life, but they tend to be national in death."o And although the EU (a
regional organization) and the IMF (a global organization) together provided
June Euro Summit (July 9, 2012) (on file with editor).
71. See ECB, Financial Integration in Europe: May 2011, at 19 (May 2011) [hereinafter ECB,
Financial Integration in Europe], available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdflother/financial
integrationineurope201105en.pdf
([T]he uncertainty in sovereign bond markets interacted, in certain cases, with the confidence in
the balance sheets of banks, some of which were known or thought to be holding large volumes
of government bonds. Unequal or partial information about actual holdings of various types of
government bond by the banking sector may have exacerbated the problem.).
72. Press Release, ECB, ECB Announces Measures to Support Bank Lending and Money Market
Activity (Dec. 8, 2011) (available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_l.en.
html).
73. See Simone Manganelli, The Impact of the Securities Markets Programme, ECB RES. BULL.,
Winter 2012, at 2, 2 (stating that the Securities Markets Programme attempted to accomplish its goals by
purchasing sovereign debt).
74. Decision of the European Central Bank 2010/05, Establishing a Securities Markets Programme,
2010 O.J. (L124) 8, 8 (EU).
75. E.g., Communication from the Commission: A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and
Monetary Union, at 4-9, COM (2012) 777 final/2 (Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Blueprint] (laying out the
EU's steps to address the financial crisis, including budgetary and financial surveillance and the
implementation of crisis resolution mechanisms).
76. Council Regulation 236/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 1.
77. See, e.g., Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., IMF, Global Challenges in 2012, Speech in Berlin,
Germany (Jan. 23, 2012) (available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/012312.htm) ("It is
not about saving any one country or region. It is about saving the world from a downward economic spiral.
It is about avoiding a 1930s moment, in which inaction, insularity, and rigid ideology combine to cause a
collapse in global demand.").
78. Stefan Avdjiev et al., The Euro Area Crisis and Cross-Border Bank Lending to Emerging Markets,
BIS Q. REv., Dec. 2012, at 37, 37 ("Cross-border bank lending to emerging markets dropped sharply in
the second half of 2011 as the euro area crisis intensified.").
79. See Hildebrand, supra note 51, at 314 ("Globalisation of the financial sector is presenting
enormous challenges to authorities around the world. Put simply: Although many risks arise at a global
level, the authorities are forced-to a large extent-to act locally.").
80. THE TURNER REVIEW, supra note 2, at 36; see also Goodhart, supra note 58, at 358 ("The
problem of how to handle cross-border financial failures in a world of national fiscal and legal
competences is understood, but not resolved.").
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financial support for sovereign debtors in crisis, that support was conditioned on new
austerity measures.8 ' Austerity measures in turn provoked domestic opposition.8
Even within the EU, which has made significant efforts over a long period of
time to establish a single market for financial services with harmonized rules of
financial regulation, there were significant gaps in the single market at the onset of
the global financial crisis.& Although the EU had harmonized many of the rules of
financial regulation, supervision of financial firms was a matter for the regulatory
authorities of the individual member states.8' The EU had an incompletely
harmonized system of deposit insurance" and no harmonized rules for bank
resolution.'
The EU's ability to act quickly to restore confidence in EU financial firms was
limited by these harmonization gaps." At times, the EU Member States acted
81. See, e.g., Press Release, IMF, Joint Statement on Greece by EU Commissioner Olli Rehn and
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn (May 2, 2010) (available at http:l/www.
imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10177.htm) (announcing 110 billion euro aid from the EU and IMF after
Greece adopted new economic policies); cf Manos Matsaganis, The Welfare State and the Crisis: The Case
of Greece, 21 J. EUR. Soc. POL'Y 501, 505-06 (2011) (describing Greek pension reform).
82. E.g., Wolfgang Riudig & Georgios Karyotis, Who Protests in Greece? Mass Opposition to
Austerity, BRIT. J. POL. SCI., Oct. 2013, at 2 ("[Alnti-austerity protest appears to have been, at least thus
far, much more intense in Greece than elsewhere, including in comparison to countries that have also had
to resort to international financial rescues.").
83. See, e.g., ECB, Financial Integration in Europe: April 2012, at 32-34 (2012), available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialintegrationineurope20l204en.pdf (describing the creation of the
EU and the single market).
84. See, e.g., id. at 87 ("Broadly speaking, the pre-crisis financial stability arrangements in the EU
were characterised by a dichotomy between the increasingly globalised nature of finance and the national
nature of supervision and regulation, which remained a prerogative of Member States, with only a modest
degree of supranational coordination.").
85. See id. at 32-35 (describing the early history of the EU, including attempts to harmonize
regulation while leaving direct supervision of financial institutions to "home country control"); cf
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Roadmap Towards
a Banking Union, at 3, COM (2012) 510 final (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Roadmap] ("Coordination
between supervisors is vital but the crisis has shown that mere coordination is not enough, in particular in
the context of a single currency and that there is a need for common decision-making.").
86. See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council: Review of
Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, at 2, COM (2010) 369 final (July 12, 2010) [hereinafter
Deposit Guarantee Schemes]
(The "minimum harmonisation" approach taken by Directive 94/19/EC resulted in significant
differences between the [deposit insurance] coverage levels in Member States. When the
financial crisis aggravated in autumn 2008, some EU depositors moved their deposits from
banks in Member States with a lower coverage level to those with higher deposit protection.).
87. Cf Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, at 4, COM (2012)
280 final (June 6, 2012)
([A]n effective policy framework is needed to manage bank failures in an orderly way and to
avoid contagion to other institutions. The aim of such a policy framework would be to equip the
relevant authorities with common and effective tools and powers to address banking crises pre-
emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayers' exposure to losses.).
88. See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, EU Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis:
"More Europe" or More Risks?, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1317, 1324-25 (2010) (footnote omitted)
(The crisis, by contrast, has not only slowed down the integration process.... The crisis
underlined how home State deposit protection schemes could be exposed to failures in host
States, and how home State resolution schemes and, ultimately, domestic tax-payers might carry
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quickly in Summit Meetings rather than going through normal EU legislative
procedures, but they incurred criticism as a result.89 And the crises imposed costs on
EU citizens in terms of rising levels of unemployment, increased taxation, and
austerity measures.90 EU action to increase financial regulatory harmonization
required negotiation, the resolution of legal disputes, and even treaty amendments.9'
There may be a financial trilemma, but loosening the grip of states on financial
regulation is not a simple matter.
A large part of the EU's difficulties in preventing and resolving the European
sovereign-debt crisis related to defects in the institutional arrangements for the euro
zone 92 and to the fact that some EU Member States are not members of the euro
zone.93  Incomplete harmonization-or at least incomplete management of risks
associated with interconnections within the EU-was a source of financial instability
in Europe, threatening to destabilize other regions of the world.94 However, whereas
the euro zone does not include all of the EU's Member States, the EU's single
market in financial services does.95 The EU has attempted to resolve the sovereign-
debt crisis by intensifying cooperation between the euro-zone states and constraining
those states' freedom of action." However, in addition to focusing on the euro-zone
the costs of failed cross-border institutions .... ).
89. See, e.g., Martin Schulz, President, European Parliament, Inaugural Speech Following His
Election as President of the European Parliament (Jan. 17, 2012) (available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/the-presidenten/press/press-releasespeeches/speeches/sp-2012/sp-2012-january/
speeches-2012-january-1.html) ("The public are responding to this lack of parliamentary legitimacy by
viewing political decisions taken by their leaders as nothing more than a series of diktats from Brussels.").
90. See, e.g., JONATHAN CRIBB ET AL., INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, LIVING STANDARDS, POVERTY
AND INEQUALITY IN THE UK: 2012 2 (2012), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comml24.pdf
(forecasting a continued decrease in British living standards due to a fall in employment and a tightened
fiscal policy, including "net tax rises and cuts to benefits," because of the euro-zone financial problems).
91. Caroline Bradley, From Global Financial Crisis to Sovereign Debt Crisis and Beyond: What Lies
Ahead for the European Monetary Union?, 22 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12 (2013)
[hereinafter, Bradley, What Lies Ahead].
92. See, e.g., IMF, World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain, at 23 (Apr. 2012)
[hereinafter IMF, World Economic Outlook], available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/
2012/01/pdf/text.pdf ("Over the medium term, many difficult decisions will be required to remedy [the
EU's Economic and Monetary Union] design flaws that contributed to the crisis.").
93. See, e.g., FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF
COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2012, Cm. 8415, at 4
(U.K.) (recognizing the need for "Eurozone countries to take steps towards closer fiscal and economic
integration" while also maintaining that the United Kingdom should remain outside the euro zone). The
euro zone comprises eighteen of the EU's twenty-eight Member States that have a common currency: the
euro. Euro Area Member States, EUROZONE PORTAL, http://www.eurozone.europa.euleuro-arealeuro-
area-member-states (last visited Apr. 5, 2014); EU Member Countries, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eulabout-eu/countries/member-countries/indexen.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2014). The
members of the euro zone are Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, and Latvia. Euro
Area Member States, supra note 93. Latvia became a member of the euro zone in January 2014. Press
Release, ECB, Latvia Joins the Euro Area (Jan. 1, 2014) (available at http://www.
ecb.europa.eulpress/pr/date/2014/html/prl4OlOl.en.html).
94. See IMF, World Economic Outlook, supra note 92, at 3, 69 (including mispriced risk and national
supervision of integrated EU markets as causes of the crisis and recognizing that the financial instability in
Europe could spill over to Iran and North Africa).
95. HM GOv'T, BALANCE OF COMPETENCES, supra note 14, at 20-21.
96. Council Regulation 473/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 140) 11, 11; cf. Marog gefdovi6, Vice President,
European Comm'n Responsible for Interinstitutional Relations and Admin., The Strength of the
Community Method in Tackling the Crisis and the Role of the Lisbon Treaty, Speech at the Inst. of Int'l &
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states' fiscal situations, the EU's solution to the defects in the euro zone involves
addressing the interactions between banks and sovereigns by developing a system of
euro-zone banking supervision," and this risks undermining the single market in
98financial services.
The EU was designed from the beginning to be a common market," and legal
harmonization was intended as a mechanism for achieving a common market." The
founding treaties prohibited the Member States from maintaining in force laws that
functioned as barriers to the free movement of goods,'1 workers, " and capital"
between Member States and also empowered the EU's institutions to adopt binding
legal rules to harmonize certain laws within the EU." But the EU's approach to
achieving a single market has developed over time from an initial focus on achieving
detailed harmonization, to mutual recognition based on minimum harmonization
measures, to more recent attempts to achieve more complete and detailed
harmonization through maximum harmonization measures" and even EU-level
regulation.'6 Establishing separate rules in the euro zone and the wider EU would
conflict with the idea of a single market. Separate systems of administration of
common rules (with the risk of divergent interpretations of the common rules) also
risk undermining the single marketfor
European Affairs (Feb. 17, 2012) (transcript on file with editor)
(I think it's fair to say that the fundamental lesson of the crisis is that of interdependence: now
more than ever, we need greater integration to ensure that national economic and budgetary
policies cannot again have such a devastating effect on the euro area and by extension the EU
as a whole.).
97. Blueprint, supra note 75, at 7-8.
98. Although note that the crises also tended to undermine the single market, for example by
encouraging banks to focus on domestic lending. See ECB, Financial Integration in Europe, supra note 71,
at 31-34 (addressing that Member States chose to act unilaterally during the early stages of the financial
crisis and encouraged banks to focus on domestic lending).
99. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 2, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
100. See id. arts. 100-02 (setting out means by which the European Economic Community could
harmonize laws within individual Member States); see also HM Gov'T, BALANCE OF COMPETENCES,
supra note 14, at 13 (discussing the creation of the common market).
101. Treaty of Rome arts. 9-37.
102. Id. arts. 48-51.
103. Id. arts. 67-73.
104. Id. arts. 100-02.
105. See, e.g., HM GOv'T, BALANCE OF COMPETENCES, supra note 14, at 13-16 (explaining the
evolution of the single market through treaties and legislation). The EU's prospectus rules are maximum
harmonization measures: Member States are prohibited from imposing more demanding rules than those
established in the Directive. Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64, 66 (EC). The liability regimes in the
Member States do vary, however. See, e.g., European Sec. & Mkts. Auth. [ESMA], Report: Comparison
of Liability Regimes in Member States in Relation to the Prospectus Directive, at 12-27, ESMA/2013/619
(May 30, 2013) (comparing liability regimes of Member States adopting measures to ensure stability
during financial crisis).
106. See Council Regulation 513/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 145) 30, 30 (noting that the regulation intended to
make ESMA "exclusively responsible for the registration and supervision of credit rating agencies in the
Union"). For the original regulation, see Council Regulation 1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1.
107. See Moloney, supra note 88 at 1321 ("[P]ressure for greater homogeneity in, and centralization
of, 'law in action' (supervision and enforcement) is increasing, countering the strong practical, political,
legal, and Treaty forces which have retained supervision and enforcement at domestic levels.")
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The EU reacted to the financial crisis by acknowledging the Member States'
political imperatives to protect domestic financial institutions and liberalizing
constraints on state aid." But the EU also enacted centralizing measures, changing
the institutional structures for financial regulation in the EU and creating EU-level
authorities with new regulatory powers.'" For example, the European Securities and
Markets Authority authorizes and regulates credit-rating agencies within the EU. 0
The EU established a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to address issues of
financial stability within the EU and empowered the ESRB to implement
international financial stability standards in the EU."' The ESRB has addressed
issues of interconnection, stating, for example, that national authorities responsible
for macroprudential policy should be "as a minimum operationally independent, in
particular from political bodies and from the financial industry.", 2 Similarly, the EU
acted to control volatility by regulating short selling and credit-default swaps."' The
EU institutions have considered proposals to harmonize rules relating to deposit
insurance". and to rescuing financial institutions in distress."' In many ways the EU's
108. Commission Communication, The Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in
Relation to Financial Institutions in the Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis, 2008 O.J. (C 270)
8, 8-9; see also Michael Reynolds et al., EU Competition Policy in the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary
Measures, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1670, 1689 (2010) ("The Commission has attempted to find a middle
way between states clamoring for the power to rescue their most important financial institutions and legal
purists decrying an apparent chasm between the existing state aid rules and the practice of the
Commission.").
109. Council Regulation 1093/2010, Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European
Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12, 13-14; Council Regulation 1095/2010, Establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), 2010 0.J. (L 331) 84, 84-86; Council
Regulation 1094/2010, Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48, 48-58.
110. Council Regulation 513/2011, supra note 106, at 30-31.
111. Council Regulation 1092/2010, On European Union Macro-Prudential Oversight of the
Financial System and Establishing a European Systematic Risk Board, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1, 5-6.
112. See, e.g., Opinion of the European Systemic Risk Board on the Macro-Prudential Mandate of
National Authorities, 2012 O.J. (C 41) 1, 3.
113. Council Regulation 236/2012, supra note 76, at 1
(At the height of the financial crisis in September 2008, competent authorities in several
Member States ... adopted emergency measures to restrict or ban short selling in some or all
securities .... The measures adopted by Member States were divergent as the Union lacks a
specific common regulatory framework for dealing with short selling issues.).
114. E.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive
94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes as Regards the Coverage Level and the Payout Delay, at 4, COM
(2008) 661 final (Oct. 15, 2008)
(The current Directive allows an optional co-insurance of up to 10%, i.e. a certain percentage of
losses that is borne by the depositor. This has proven counterproductive for the confidence of
depositors and may have exacerbated the problems. The argument of moral hazard (depositors
should be "punished" if they deposit their funds at a bank offering high interest rates but
incurring high risks) is not tenable since retail depositors cannot, in general, judge the financial
soundness of their bank. Consequently, this option should be discontinued.);
see also Council Directive 2009/14, 2009 O.J. (L68) 3, 3-4 (detailing the need for improvement of coverage
for depositors); Deposit Guarantee Schemes, supra note 86 (discussing the appropriateness as well as the
cost-benefit analysis of a deposit-guarantee scheme in the EU); cf Sebastian Schich, Financial Crisis:
Deposit Insurance and Related Financial Safety Net Aspects, OECD J. FIN. MKT. TRENDS, Dec. 2008, at
73, 93-101 (detailing issues, such as moral hazard and loss of credibility, that may arise if government
deposit guarantees are perceived as limitless or do not have an exit strategy).
115. See Commission Communication: An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in
the Banking Sector, at 2, COM (2009) 561 final (Oct. 20, 2009) ("In autumn 2008, Member States agreed to
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approach to new financial regulation in the wake of the financial crisis has followed
international initiatives."6 But market participants have sought to identify ways in
which the EU's approach diverges from approaches in other jurisdictions and have at
times urged the EU to wait until international standards are agreed upon before
acting."'
With respect to the idea that some problems of interconnection might be dealt
with by breaking rather than managing connections, the EU adopted a regulation in
2012, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) on "OTC derivatives,
central counterparties and trade repositories."... EMIR provides for central clearing
of certain classes of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives; the application of risk
mitigation techniques for noncentrally cleared OTC derivatives; reporting to trade
repositories; the application of regulatory requirements to central counterparties
with respect to organization, conduct of business, and prudential requirements; and
requirements for trade repositories, including a duty to make certain data available
to the public and relevant authorities."9 EMIR recognizes that the EU needs to
interact with other jurisdictions in the regulation of swaps. For example, recital
number six to EMIR states that "[t]he Commission should cooperate with third-
country authorities in order to explore mutually supportive solutions to ensure
consistency between this Regulation and the requirements established by third
countries and thus avoid any possible overlapping in this respect." 20 The broad
design of the EU rules tracks international standards 21 and the U.S. approach to
derivatives regulation.122 However, market participants expressed concern that the
details of the rules in the EU and in the United States would differ.123 In July 2013
the EU and the United States announced that they would adopt a "Common Path"
to regulating derivatives.124
Like the United States, the EU has been considering how to separate core
banking functions from other functions in which financial institutions engage. The
EU published a proposal to separate core banking from noncore banking in 2012
take the necessary action to recapitalise and guarantee banks, and this unprecedented action was
coordinated at European level on an ad-hoc basis.").
116. See ECB, The New EU Framework for Financial Crisis Management and Resolution, MONTHLY
BULL. (July 2011), at 85, 87-89, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/art3_mb2011
07en.pp85-94en.pdf (detailing international and national initiatives and how the EU is taking global
initiatives into account in the design of the European framework of financial regulation and crisis
management).
117. E.g., ASS'N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUR., supra note 41, at 3 ("A global approach to addressing issues
is required. We believe EU policy makers should wait for the approach for shadow banking to be settled
globally before proceeding with regulatory proposals.").
118. Commission Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 1.
119. Id. at 8-9, 14; accord European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), ESMA, http://www.
esma.europa.eu/page/European-Market-Infrastructure-Regulation-EMIR (last visited Apr. 5, 2014)
(detailing the main obligations, scope, timing, and exemptions of EMIR).
120. Commission Regulation 648/2012, supra note 118, at 2.
121. See FSB, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, supra note 47, at 3-7 (summarizing
international standards recommended by the G20 for over-the-counter derivative-market reform).
122. For an analysis of the U.S. approach to derivative regulation embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act,
see U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011-2015 18-26 (2011).
123. E.g., Karel Lannoo, The New Financial Regulatory Paradigm: A Transatlantic Perspective, at 1, 5
(Ctr. for European Policy Studies, CEPS Policy Brief No. 287, 2013), available at http://www.ceps.
be/book/new-financial-regulatory-paradigm-transatlantic-perspective.
124. Derivatives Common Path, supra note 36.
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(the Liikanen Report) a year after the United States published its proposed Volcker
Rule.'25 As of the fall of 2013 neither proposal has been adopted. 26 In May 2013 the
EU Commission published a consultation document on structural reform of banking
in the EU.' The Commission wrote that:
Structural reforms of the banks that are too-big-to-fail would directly
address intra-group complexity, intra-group subsidies, and excessive risk-
taking incentives. Structural reforms may increase the credibility and
effectiveness of the recovery and resolution process for large and complex
banking groups, thereby lowering the ultimate taxpayer costs. Structural
reforms also aim at a broader set of objectives, such as aligning the private
incentives of banks with socially useful activities.
The Commission suggested that EU rules were necessary to limit the
possibilities for regulatory arbitrage and to reduce market fragmentation that might
result from divergent rules in different Member States.2 9 Within the EU, therefore,
regulation of the structure of banks is linked to issues of geography. The
International Swaps and Derivatives Association and the Association for Financial
Markets in Europe argued that structural reform of banking in the EU could be
harmful, reducing competition by increasing barriers to entry and preventing banks
from responding to their clients' needs.o Structural separation of banking and
nonbanking functions is intended to address risks that are not adequately addressed
by regulatory measures such as capital requirements.1' But, for a number of reasons,
attempting to implement structural separation is costly.'32 In particular, defining the
boundaries between permissible and impermissible activities for banks is complex."'
125. Liikanen Report, supra note 45. For a discussion of the different proposals, see Vifials et al.,
supra note 50, at 14-16.
126. See Jesse Hamilton & Cheyenne Hopkins, Volcker Rule Costs Tallied as U.S. Regulators Press
Deadline, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-30/volcker-
rule-costs-tallied-as-u-s-regulators-press-deadline.html (discussing current status of Volcker rule and
reasons for the delay of its implementation); Howard Davies, JP Morgan's Troubles Reignite the Debate
on Banks Too Big to Fail, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2013, 8:23 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
business/economics-blog/2013/oct/21/jp-morgan-troubles-bank-too-big-fail (reporting reluctance to adopt
the Liikanen proposal in Europe). The Final Volcker Rule was published in the Federal Register in
January 2014. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests In, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536 (Jan. 31. 2014).
127. Commission Consultation Paper on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eulintemal-market/consultations/2013/banking-structural-
reform/docs/consultation-document-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
128. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 2-3.
130. Letter from Michael Lever, Managing Dir., Ass'n for Fin. Mkts. in Eur., & Richard Metcalfe,
Deputy Reg'1 Dir. & Senior Regulatory Advisor, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, to Alain Deckers, Head
of Unit H2, Directorate Gen. Internal Mkt. & Servs., European Comm'n (July 11, 2013) (available at
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NTcOMw==/http-assets.isda.org-media-d268a4bb_6la4360c.pdf)
(In summary, structural separation of all of EU banks' trading activities is likely to lead to major
changes in the structure of European capital markets. In effect, it would establish substantial
barriers to entry for EU based banks, force the withdrawal of smaller and mid-sized service
providers that depend on an overall relationship-based business model and restrict the ability of
large banks to develop their business models to accommodate for changes in client and market
requirements.).
131. E.g., Vifials et al., supra note 50, at 9, box 1, 14-16.
132. See, e.g., id. at 19 tbl.3 (breaking down potential costs of structural banking reform under the
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The TBTF problem (for which structural separation represents a set of
proposed solutions) is a global problem. But while the EU sought to address the
global financial crisis by developing EU financial regulation in line with developing
international standards (including international standards with respect to TBTF), the
EU also had to address its own developing euro-zone sovereign-debt crisis that was
prompted by strains on the budgets of some Member States caused by bailing out
financial institutions in crisis and by poor fiscal management." Addressing
interconnections (especially between banks and sovereigns) within the euro zone was
an urgent issue because of the sovereign-debt crisis. Concerns about the reliability of
official data exacerbated the crisis.' The fiscal policies of the euro-zone Members
were meant to be controlled by the EU's Stability and Growth Pact, but in practice
this control was ineffective,' in part because of the single currency's importance as a
tool of integration.' The EU and the IMF together provided financial support to
euro-zone sovereigns in crisis on condition that those sovereigns implemented
policies of austerity.
The EU sovereign-debt crisis illustrates interconnections as a source of financial
instability, both in terms of the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns"' and in
terms of the transmission of instability between members of the euro zone.4 0 The
EU example illustrates the risks of interconnectedness and the difficulties of
achieving centralization of financial regulation and supervision. In particular,
harmonization processes tend to be incremental and imperfect even within a strong
system of harmonization like the EU's."' But as the euro zone's problems
threatened to undermine the euro and even the EU as a whole, it was clear that EU
policymakers were convinced that what mattered was not just the management of
Volcker rule, the United Kingdom's ring-fence, and the Liikanen proposal).
133. See, e.g., id. at 20 (pointing out that the high costs of implementing certain structural IMF
reforms "relate to the challenge of distinguishing proscribed trading from permitted transactions and the
resulting burden of compliance and reporting").
134. E.g., Blundell-Wignall & Slovik, supra note 53, at 2.
135. See, e.g., Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2011,
at 4 (Aug. 2011) ("The dire economic situation was magnified by lost credibility as serious deficiencies in
statistical monitoring of government accounts were exposed."); cf Matsaganis, supra note 81, at 501 ("The
revised figures stunned public opinion at home and shocked markets abroad.").
136. See, e.g., Ludger Schuknecht et al., The Stability and Growth Pact: Crisis and Reform, at 1, 9
(European Cent. Bank, ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 129, 2011), available at http://www.ecb.int/
pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocpl29.pdf (noting that although the Member States agreed on a Stability and Growth
Pact as a component of the institutional arrangements for the Euro, the "Pact's Achilles heel was its weak
enforcement provisions"); see also IMF, World Economic Outlook, supra note 92, at 3 ("The Stability and
Growth Pact was devised to bring about fiscal discipline but failed to forestall bad fiscal policies.").
137. See, e.g., David Marsh, Faltering Ambitions and Unrequited Hopes: The Battle for the Euro
Intensifies, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 45, 46 (2011) (discussing how the euro was created as part of an
overall goal of greater political union).
138. See, e.g., IMF, Greece: Request for Stand-by Arrangement, at 8, IMF Country Report No. 10/111
(May 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10111.pdf (noting that Greece
would, among other measures, implement pension reform, health reform, and tax reform).
139. Blueprint, supra note 75, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. at 3 (stating that the inception of the European Monetary Union (EMU) "accelerated the
transmission of shocks across national borders").
141. See id. at 33 ("Attaining a deep and genuine EMU involves incremental measures, building on
what would have been achieved over the short and the medium-term and introducing further integration
on a step-by-step, policy-by-policy basis.").
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bank/state and state/state interconnections, but the management of market
participants' perceptions of risks to financial stability.'42
The EU now seeks to address both sets of interconnections by reinforcing fiscal
controls and controls over banks. In addressing the interconnections, the EU has
acted to develop stronger fiscal discipline' and to negotiate the establishment of a
European Banking Union in which the ECB will be responsible for bank supervision
within the euro zone.'" Many of the documents referring to the European Banking
Union state that its purpose is to end the vicious circle between banks and
sovereigns."' Although the EU documents proposing the European Banking Union
do not suggest that the European Banking Union is necessary to remedy defective
national supervision of banks,'" the financial crisis and events in Cyprus in 20121'4 did
suggest that there were some weaknesses in EU banking supervision."8
142. See, e.g., id. at 10 (acknowledging that because the crises led market participants to fear that the
single currency may fail, there was less confidence in the EU's "model of a social market economy" and
instead a "reinstating [of] the constraining power of national borders").
143. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Mar.
2, 2012, T/SCG, available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/579087/treaty.pdf; Treaty
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012, T/ESM 2012, available at http://www.
european-council.europa.eulmedia/582311/05-tesm2.enl2.pdf.
144. Roadmap, supra note 85, at 7; Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on
the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions, at 2, COM (2012) 511 final (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal for Conferring Specific
Tasks]; see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking
Authority) as Regards Its Interaction with Council Regulation (EU) No..J... Conferring Specific Tasks on
the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions, COM (2012) 512 final, at 2-3 (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal for Amending Regulation
Establishing EBA] (discussing the ECB's supervisory role and the changes that should be made to the
European Banking Authority so that its work will complement that of the ECB); Blueprint, supra note 75,
at 11-13 (discussing the various short- and long-term steps that the EU should take in order to achieve a
stable EMU, including creating a banking union and a single supervisory mechanism); cf President of the
European Council, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, at 2 (Dec. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsData/docs/pressdatalen/ec/134069.pdf [hereinafter Van
Rompuy Report] (discussing broadly the general steps that the EU could take in order to create a
"genuine [EMU]"); President of the European Council, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary
Union, at 4-7 (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsdata/docs/
pressdatalenec/131201.pdf (discussing the many challenges faced by the EMU and that a more detailed
timetable needs to be worked out in order to create a "road map for the achievement of the genuine
[EMU]").
145. E.g., Blueprint, supra note 75, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(The euro area summit held on 29 June 2012 marked a turning point in the approach to the
crisis. It recognized the imperative need to break the vicious circle between banks and
sovereigns that is weakening the finances of euro area countries, to the point of threatening the
very existence of the EMU.);
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, para. 10 (Dec. 14, 2012), available at http://www.
consilium.europa.euluedocs/cmsDataldocs/pressdatalen/ec/134353.pdf#page=2 ("It is imperative to break
the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.").
146. Cf FSB, Peer Review of Italy, at 5 (Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110207b.pdf (stating that Italian resilience can be attributed to
"the traditional, relationship-oriented business model and stable retail funding base of Italian banks" as
well as the "regulatory and supervisory framework").
147. IMF, Statement by Mr. Snel and Mr. Kanaris on Cyprus, at 1 (May 10, 2013) available at
http://www.stockwatch.com.cy/media/announce-pdflMayl5_2013_IMF.pdf
(Although Cyprus had weathered the beginnings of the European crisis relatively well,
reluctance to correct long standing imbalances, the lax fiscal policies and the banking sector's
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The 2012 proposal for a European Banking Union was published under
Herman Van Rompuy's name 9 and was based on a system of integrated supervision
of banks, a European deposit-insurance scheme, and a European resolution
scheme.' If the euro zone is to develop a system for rescuing troubled banks, it
makes sense for the euro zone to be involved in supervising those banks: The
interconnections between bank supervision, deposit insurance, and bank resolution
are evident. Although the euro zone has suffered from problems that have not
affected the wider EU, the euro zone is part of the EU and thus of the single internal
market in financial services."' The planned European Banking Union would operate
alongside the EU's single market in financial services.15 The Commission described
the single market and the European Banking Union as "mutually reinforcing
processes""' and has argued that the European Banking Union "would be able to
end the disintegration of the EU's financial market and ensure reasonably equal
financing conditions for households and business across the EU,"'54 but there is clear
potential for collision. Although the Commission wrote in its Roadmap in
September 2012 that a "single rulebook" for the single market within the EU was
essential for the European Banking Union,' it soon became doubtful that the
Commission's desired version of a single rulebook would be in place before the
establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)."' In May 2013 Vitor
ConstAncio, Vice President of the ECB, stated that "[t]he more membership overlaps
between the EU and the SSM, the more consistent will be the application of
supervisory and regulatory practices."'5 7
Like most of the European project, the process of working toward a European
Banking Union is slow and incremental.'" The EU institutions emphasized that they
large exposure to Greece had started taking the toll on the country's ability to refinance its debt
at rates compatible with long term fiscal sustainability.).
148. See, e.g., IMF, Cyprus: Request for Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, at 25, IMF
Country Report No. 13/125 (May 2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr
13125.pdf ("Lax supervisory practices have contributed to the buildup of vulnerabilities in the banking
sector.").
149. Herman Van Rompuy is the first permanent President of the European Council, an EU
institution that brings together the "Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its
President and the President of the [European] Commission" to define the EU's direction and priorities.
The European Council - An Official Institution of the EU, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, http://www.european-
council.europa.eu/the-institution?lang=en (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
150. Van Rompuy Report, supra note 144, at 4-5. For a proposal for an EU deposit-insurance scheme
and resolution fund, see generally Dirk Schoenmaker & Daniel Gros, A European Deposit Insurance and
Resolution Fund (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, CEPS Working Document No. 364, 2012).
151. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
152. Roadmap, supra note 85, at 4.
153. Id.
154. Blueprint, supra note 75, at 10.
155. Roadmap, supra note 85, at 4.
156. See Blueprint, supra note 75, at 17-18 (recognizing in October 2012 that although the SSM was
to be implemented early in 2013, various proposals for a single rulebook were still under negotiation).
157. Vitor Constincio, Vice President, ECB, Implications of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM) on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), Speech at a Public Hearing on Financial
Supervision in the EU (May 24, 2013) (available at http://www.bis.org/review/rl30527c.pdf).
158. Blueprint, supra note 75, at 33 ("Attaining a deep and genuine EMU involves incremental
measures, building on what would have been achieved over the short and the medium-term and
introducing further integration on a step-by-step, policy-by-policy basis.").
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intended to proceed in a way that satisfied requirements of democratic accountability
and legitimacy.159 This is a recurrent issue within the EU: Discussions of the
democratic deficit in Europe are longstanding,'" and although the EU has made
significant progress in increasing the role of the directly elected European Parliament
in the legislative process"' and in recognizing national parliaments in the EU's
institutional structures, 62 the financial crises and the concomitant emergency and
austerity measures have stressed European democratic processes and EU citizens'
confidence in the EU's commitment to democracy.
Van Rompuy's European Banking Union proposal encompassed common
supervision and common arrangements for deposit insurance and resolution;"
however, the EU began to work on common supervision before implementing a
common-resolution regime"' because common supervision was less controversial
than common deposit insurance and resolution.'" The European Banking Union
plan envisaged the creation of a European Resolution Authority, which the ECB
said "should be established, or at least there should be clear deadlines for its
establishment, when the ECB assumes its supervisory responsibility in full."68 In
July 2013 the Commission published a proposal for a single resolution mechanism
and bank resolution fund for the euro area.'69 Although these new measures would
create further distinctions between euro-zone banks and other EU banks, the
Commission argued that banks outside the euro zone would benefit from enhanced
bank supervision in the euro zone.o
159. See id. at 11 ("The deeper integration of financial regulation, fiscal and economic policy and
corresponding instruments must be accompanied by commensurate political integration, ensuring
democratic legitimacy and accountability.").
160. See generally Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A
Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 533 (2006) (comparing different
perspectives on the existence and extent of a democratic deficit in the EU).
161. Id. at 535.
162. E.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 12, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 13, 21 (describing the function of national parliaments within the greater EU structure).
163. Bradley, What Lies Ahead, supra note 91, at 16.
164. See Blueprint, supra note 75, at 17 ("The first, crucial step on this path will be the Single
Supervisory Mechanism, which must subsequently be complemented by a Single Resolution
Mechanism .... ).
165. Presidency Conclusions, supra note 145, paras. 7-8.
166. Cf EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: KEY ISSUES AND
CHALLENGES, 2012-3, H.L. 88, at 11 (U.K.) ("[T]he proposals for a European resolution scheme and, in
particular, a European deposit insurance scheme, have proved politically contentious for net contributor
Member States, notably Germany.").
167. See Blueprint, supra note 75, at 18-19 (discussing a Single Resolution Mechanism).
168. Opinion of the European Central Bank on a Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring
Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of
Credit Institutions and a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European
Banking Authority), 2013 O.J. (C 30) 6, 7 [hereinafter Opinion of the ECB].
169. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing Uniform
Rules and a Uniform Procedure for the Resolution of Credit Institutions and Certain Investment Firms in the
Framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and Amending
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, at 3-4, COM (2013) 520
final (July 10, 2013).
170. Id. at 2-3.
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The core of the SSM is the transfer of supervisory responsibilities for euro-zone
banks to the ECB."' Non-euro-zone Members of the EU will be able to opt into the
SSM.172 The ECB does not have experience in bank supervision and will need
additional resources to carry out supervisory functions with respect to 6000 banks."
In practice, the ECB will supervise larger banks, and national regulators will
continue to supervise smaller banks."' The SSM is designed as a limited
centralization of supervisory authority."' But centralization of supervision, or at
least of the oversight of supervision, in the ECB is meant to ensure that banks within
the SSM are subject to more uniform supervision than they would be in a
decentralized supervisory regime. 6  This advantage of the SSM might encourage
national regulators outside the SSM to conform their supervision to the ECB's
approach."
Commentators have expressed a number of concerns about the European
Banking Union: from worries that the ECB's responsibilities for monetary policy
will conflict with its role as a bank supervisor;' 8 to concerns about the interactions
among the European Banking Union, SSM, and the single market;79 to whether the
171. See Blueprint, supra note 75, at 17 ("The [SSM] as proposed by the Commission is based on the
transfer to the European level of specific, key supervisory tasks for banks established in the euro area
Member States. . . .").
172. Id.; cf IMF, Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article IV Consultation-Selected Issues Paper, at 15, IMF
Country Report No. 12/182 (July 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/
2012/crl2182.pdf (stating that the "framework of the Banking Union should allow other EU countries to
opt-in").
173. See Vitor Constfncio, Vice President, ECB, Establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism,
Speech at the BAFT-IFSA 2013 Europe Bank-to-Bank Forum (Jan. 29, 2013) (available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/spl30129_1.en.htm) (acknowledging that it is "neither
realistic nor desirable" to have the ECB supervise more than 6000 credit institutions and that no agency
can have the resources to be perfect in its supervisory duties).
174. See, e.g., id. (discussing how the legislation proposed to leave "'less significant' credit
institutions" to the regulation of the Member States).
175. Id. ("[T]he ECB would be directly responsible for the supervision of a limited number of
institutions which covers nevertheless more than 80% of the euro area banking system in terms of assets.
The methodology also ensures that the majority of the financial system of SSM countries is covered.").
176. Id. States, rather than banks, have the ability to opt into the SSM. See Blueprint, supra note 75,
at 33, 39 (arguing that non-euro-zone Member States could be allowed to opt in "if [they] wished" but that
any opt-in should be "irrevocable").
177. Cf Gadinis, supra note 1, at 173-74 (stating the implementation of global standards may vary by
region and noting that "peer pressure among jurisdictions to comply" with these global requirements may
increase compliance even among nations that do not participate in the FSB).
178. See, e.g., Constincio, supra note 173 (discussing the various problems the ECB will face and
arguing that failures of financial supervision would harm the ECB's reputation in the context of its
management of monetary policy ).
179. See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: KEY ISSUES AND
CHALLENGES, 2012-3, H.L. 88, at 12 (U.K.) ("Membership of the banking union and the single market will
not correspond. The strain on the single market will be compounded by the potential impact of the
proposals on the relative powers and influence of the ECB. ); cf Presidency Conclusions, supra note
145, para. 4
(The process of completing EMU will build on the EU's institutional and legal framework. It
will be open and transparent towards Member States not using the single currency. Throughout
the process the integrity of the Single Market will be fully respected, including in the different
legislative proposals which will be made. It is also important to ensure a level playing field
between Member States which take part in the SSM and those which do not.).
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ECB has the capability to act as a banking supervisor." The ECB has sought to
quell these concerns:
From the ECB's perspective, the proposed SSM regulation should comply
with the following main principles. First, the ECB, within the SSM, should
be able to carry out the tasks assigned to it effectively and rigorously
without any risk to its reputation. Second, the ECB should remain
independent in carrying out all its tasks. Third, there should be a strict
separation between the ECB's new tasks concerning supervision and its
monetary policy tasks assigned by the Treaty. Fourth, the ECB should be
able to have full recourse to the knowledge, expertise and operational
resources of national supervisory authorities. Fifth, the SSM should
operate in a manner fully consistent with the principles underpinning the
single market in financial services and in full adherence to the single
rulebook for financial services. In this regard, the ECB also welcomes the
possibility to involve non-euro area Member States in the SSM to ensure
greater harmonisation of supervisory practices within the European Union,
thus strengthening the internal market. Sixth, the ECB is ready to comply
with the highest standards of accountability for the supervisory tasks.""
The United Kingdom, where a large part of EU financial activity has been
located, which sees financial services as a significant contributor to its economy and
takes pride in its system of financial regulation and participation in global standard
setting,'18 2 will not join the SSM 8 (and it is even possible that the United Kingdom
will leave the EU).' If the distinction between the euro zone and the broader EU
persists,18 the EU's sectoral authorities and the ECB will need to collaborate on
evolution of the EU's system of financial regulation." The original European
Banking Union proposals contain arrangements for coordination of the roles of the
ECB and European Banking Authority (EBA)." For example, the proposal for
180. Cf Consthncio, supra note 173 (acknowledging that allowing the ECB full supervision of all
banks "is neither realistic nor desirable ... considering both the wealth of expertise at national level and
the advantages stemming from proximity in supervision").
181. Opinion of the ECB, supra note 168, at 7.
182. Cf Caroline Bradley, Financial Trade Associations and Multilevel Regulation, in MULTILEVEL
REGULATION AND THE EU: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN GLOBAL, EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL
NORMATIVE PROCESSES 73, 81-82 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Bradley, Financial
Trade Associations and Multilevel Regulation] (discussing the development of the United Kingdom as a
world leader in financial services, in part as a result of its regulatory policies).
183. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: UK GOVERNMENT
POLICY, 2013-4, H.C. 87-1, para. 82.
184. See David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, EU Speech at Bloomberg (Jan. 23, 2013)
(available at http://www.numberlO.gov.uk/news/eu-speech-at-bloomberg/) (promising to offer British
citizens a referendum if the Conservative Party wins the next election on whether the United Kingdom
should retain its EU membership).
185. The House of Lords EU Committee noted that the European Banking Union proposals would
have different implications for states that planned to remain outside the euro zone and for states that
contemplated joining the euro zone in future. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, EUROPEAN BANKING
UNION: KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES, 2012-3, H.L. 88, at 12 (U.K.).
186. See Proposal for Conferring Specific Tasks, supra note 144, at 3-4 (proposing that the ECB will
closely cooperate with the three European supervisory authorities).
187. See, e.g., Roadmap, supra note 85, at 5-6 (addressing the roles of the ECB and the EBA as well
as the importance to the ECB of the EBA in performing its functions competently). But cf. EUROPEAN
UNION COMMITTEE, EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES, 2012-3, H.L. 88, at 27
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amendments to the EBA regulation adjusts the rules for decision making "to ensure
that the integrity of the internal market remains preserved while avoiding at the
same time the risk of paralysing the EBA decision making."'"
For the time being, the EU is working on transferring the supervision of euro-
zone banks (and not other financial institutions) to the ECB.'" From the perspective
of financial stability and interconnectedness, this solution is only a partial solution.
The ECB would be supervising banks but not shadow banks.'" On the other hand, if
the ECB were to gain supervisory powers over nonbanks, this would exacerbate the
euro-zone/EU single-market tensions.'9'
The recent evolution of EU financial regulation has combined moving forward
with the G20 agenda for the reform of financial regulation with taking action to
address the eurozone's particular crisis.'" In addressing revisions to financial
regulation from these two quite different perspectives, it is clear that the EU has, at
times, needed to address immediate threats to financial stability (even financial
instabilities) rather than address the longer-term issues. And the distinction between
the euro-zone and non-euro-zone EU is set to become greater in the future: The
Blueprint even imagined a new, "more active role" for the euro zone in "multilateral
institutions and fora as well as in bilateral dialogues with strategic partners,"'9 3 a
euro-zone fiscal capacity, 94 and the issuance of eurobills." Potential fragmentation
with respect to regulation in the EU raises issues of how effectively the EU can
address issues of interconnectedness in the financial markets.
(U.K.) (footnote omitted)
(As an EU-wide institution, one of the EBA's fundamental objectives is to ensure the effective
functioning of the single market. The issues of how such a relatively small and newly-
established body will interact with such an immensely powerful institution as the ECB, and the
potential consequences for the integrity of the single market .. . will become vital ones to
address.).
188. Proposal for Amending Regulation Establishing EBA, supra note 144, at 4.
189. See Proposal for Conferring Specific Tasks, supra note 144, at 4 ("The ECB will be exclusively
competent for key supervisory tasks which are indispensable to detect risks for banks' viability and require
them to take the necessary action.").
190. Cf ASS'N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUR., supra note 41, at 2-3 ("[O]ur views echo those of the
ECB ... that any shadow bank regulation needs to be thoroughly analysed in terms of costs and benefits
and focus only on systemically important institutions and activities.").
191. See Bradley, What Lies Ahead, supra note 91, at 34-35 (noting that the creation of a regulatory
scheme that would not apply to banks would draw new distinctions between the euro zone and EU and
would interfere with the single market).
192. See id. at 21-22
(The EU is part of the G20, and as the G20's work on financial stability ... evolves, the EU is
becoming more of a layer within a more complex multilevel system of financial regulation.
While the G20 has reacted to the global financial crisis by emphasizing the need for increased
harmonization of standards for financial regulation at the international level, EU institutions
have reacted to the crises by increasing EU level regulation of financial firms, financial markets,
and the economic policies of the Member States.).
193. Blueprint, supra note 75, at 25.
194. Id. at 27.
195. Id. at 29-30.
196. See Liikanen Report, supra note 45, at 30-31 (discussing the risk of "retrenchment of banks
behind national borders" as a result of efforts to regulate the financial market).
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CONCLUSIONS
Within the EU and at the international level, policymakers focusing on financial
regulation are trying to protect financial stability by addressing issues of
interconnectedness across territorial borders, across market sectors, and through
transactional linkages. The policies they are developing involve recognizing and
managing interconnectedness or preventing it by enforcing separation. The entire
EU project is one of moving toward an ever-closer union, even if incrementally.197
The Commission tends to assume that more geographic integration is desirable.
The Member States do not always agree." But whereas geographic integration is the
objective of the EU, there is no preordained EU view as to whether it is better to
address interconnectedness between different sectors of financial regulation by
managing the interconnectedness or by enforcing separations (although the EU does
have separate sectoral authorities for banking, securities, and insurance and
occupational pensions). Thus, the Liikanen Report, the result of a post-financial-
crisis review of EU financial regulation, advocated EU measures to separate core
banking activities from proprietary trading in securities and derivatives, which are
viewed as excessively risky.2m The idea of separation is very similar to the U.S.
proposals in the Volcker rule. And market participants have reacted to this
proposal, much as they have to the proposed Volcker rule, by arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to support the proposal.20 ' In addition, market participants have
argued that it would be problematic for the EU to adopt separation requirements
that differed from those in other jurisdictions,2" and in particular, that this would
197. Subsidiarity should provide opportunities to argue against integration and harmonization in all
cases.
198. See, e.g., Blueprint, supra note 75, at 1 (lauding the achievements of the euro in integrating
Europe without acknowledging any concerns as to its desirability).
199. See, e.g., FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: UK
GOVERNMENT POLICY, 2013-4, H.C. 87-1, paras. 88-92 (explaining that the EU's attempts to increase
integration have caused the U.K. government concern that its interests are not being best served by the
EU); cf Cameron, supra note 184 (addressing "public disillusionment" that the EU is moving toward
"political integration" and not just economic integration).
200. Liikanen Report, supra note 45, at iii
([Piroprietary trading and other significant trading activities should be assigned to a separate
legal entity if the activities to be separated amount to a significant share of a bank's business.
This would ensure that trading activities beyond the threshold are carried out on a stand-alone
basis and separate from the deposit bank. As a consequence, deposits, and the explicit and
implicit guarantee they carry, would no longer directly support risky trading activities. The
long-standing universal banking model in Europe would remain, however, untouched, since the
separated activities would be carried out in the same banking group. Hence, banks' ability to
provide a wide range of financial services to their customers would be maintained.).
201. E.g., Directorate Gen. Internal Mkt. & Servs. Summary of the Replies to the Consultation of the
Internal Market and Services Directorate General on the Recommendations of the High-Level Expert
Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, at 2 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/consultations/2012/hleg-banking/replies-summary-en.pdf [hereinafter
Summary of the Replies] ("In general, banks welcomed the Group's analysis, but argued that a compelling
case for mandatory separation of trading activities has not been made. They felt that the proposal was not
backed by the required evidence, and that there was a need for a thorough impact assessment.").
202. Id. at 3 ("Banks are concerned about inconsistency between structural reforms at EU level and
what has already been proposed in the USA and the UK."); cf Simon Johnson, Last-Ditch Attempt to
Derail Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIx BLOG (Dec. 20, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/12/20/last-ditch-attempt-to-derail-volcker-rule/ (noting arguments that the Volcker rule
violates the United States' trade obligations).
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harm the competitiveness of EU-based firms.203 This example illustrates that in an
interconnected world, market participants can easily challenge regulatory proposals
that differ from existing rules or proposals in other jurisdictions. Differences in rules
affect the competitiveness of financial firms and deprive consumers of the choices
competition would bring. Geographic interconnectedness may thus impede
consideration of structural separations that would be conducive to financial
stability.2" Dealing with geographic and sectoral interconnectedness together is a
long and complex project.
Yet even without the sectoral issues, managing geographic interconnectedness is
not simple. Complete centralization of financial regulation would create a single
point of failure. Networks are messier and involve coordination problems, but at
least they do not have a single point of failure, they are harder to capture, and they
may generate new and useful ideas that could be squelched in a centralized regime.
Complete centralization at the global level is unlikely, and the EU example shows
that, even in a context where some level of commitment to geographic integration is
a given, centralization is difficult to achieve. The EU's sovereign-debt crisis was a
result of a failure to manage interconnections effectively, and, whereas the EU's
attempts to control its recent crises emphasize greater coordination among a subset
of EU Member States, those attempts also risk undermining the EU's achievements
in moving toward networked integration among the full EU membership.
203. See Summary of the Replies, supra note 201, at 3 (acknowledging that it has been argued that
structural reform may harm the competitiveness of EU banks).
204. See Bradley, Financial Trade Associations and Multilevel Regulation, supra note 182, at 97-99
(arguing that attempts at harmonization may affect financial firms' abilities to compete globally due to
divergent implementation of standards in different countries).
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